Tuesday, May 31, 2011
Manning was mentally unstable: report
Bradley Manning, U.S. military intelligence officer charged with leaking confidential government documents to WikiLeaks, the online whistleblower website, was deployed in Iraq despite warnings from evaluators that he was not mentally stable and a risk to himself and others, an investigation has revealed.
A detailed report and video published by The Guardian newspaper showed that Mr. Manning was not only given a negative report by his commanding officers here, but was also noted by his colleagues as displaying signs buckling under enormous stress. Yet, in October 2009, Mr. Manning was sent to Forward Operating Base Hammer, near Baghdad.
The extensive investigation by The Guardian suggested that even by that point Mr. Manning had faced much bullying within the army and was also possibly distressed owing to his partner, Tyler Watkins, ending their relationship in late 2009. It was clear that he had been under much pressure when one officer said to The Guardian, “He was harassed so much that he once [urinated] in his sweatpants.”
Mr. Manning's demotion and ultimate discharge from the military came after May 7, 2010, when, according to a soldier who had been deployed to FOB Hammer alongside Mr. Manning said Mr. Manning started “blowing up and punching this chick in the face.”
It was shortly after this point, while he was still awaiting discharge for “adjustment disorder,” that he communicated with former hacker-turned-informant, Adrian Lamo. Within 24 hours of revealing to Mr. Lamo that he had possibly copied and transmitted to “WL” a vast tranche of confidential government data when he was at FOB Hammer, Mr. Lamo reported him to U.S. authorities.
Since his arrest in May 2010 evaluators have continued to assess Mr. Manning's mental health, officials confirmed, and earlier reports suggested that he might be considered to be at risk of self-harm.
However the controversial conditions of Mr. Manning's incarceration also threatened to become a major embarrassment to the administration when it became evident that he was being forced to strip down to a smock every night and was being held in solitary confinement.
While he was transferred to a lower-security prison in April 2011, his prior time in the military brig in Quantico, Virginia, saw top officials and civil society groups voicing strong protest to the treatment meted out to him by jail officers there.
In particular, U.S. State Department spokesman Philip Crowley had to resign after he described Mr. Manning's treatment as “ridiculous and counterproductive and stupid.” Further
A group of 250 legal experts including a former professor of President Barack Obama wrote a letter condemning the U.S.' describing the harsh conditions of Mr. Manning's time in jail as “illegal and immoral.”
Labels: Bradley Manning, cablegate, Philip Crowley, U.S. State Department spokesman, whistleblower, Wikileaks
Tuesday, January 11, 2011
Twitter subpoenaed over Wikileaks
From The Hindu
A federal court in the United States has issued a subpoena to social networking website Twitter to obtain information on several individuals linked to Wikileaks, the whistleblower website, including its spokesperson Julian Assange, an Icelandic Member of Parliament also named in the case said.
MP Birgitta Jonsdottir, who is reportedly a former volunteer with Wikileaks, transmitted documents to severalU.S. media outlets this week that showed an order from a court in Virginia to Twitter demanding subscriber names, user names, screen names, mailing addresses, residential addresses, connection records and other data of several persons.
According to Ms. Jonsdottir those whose information was subpoenaed included her, Mr. Assange, army intelligence officer Bradley Manning, who is currently in prison charged with leaking the documents to Wikileaks and Rop Gonggrijp, said to be a computer hacker from the Netherlands.
The subpoena follows several statements made by the U.S. government over the last few months suggesting that it would sue Wikileaks for publicly publishing secret State Department cables and war documents relating to the U.S.’ conflict engagements in Afghanistan and Iraq.
According to the court order of December 14, which was posted on the website of online magazine Salon, the District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia found that the U.S. government had “offered specific and articulable facts showing that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the records or other information sought are relevant and material to an ongoing criminal investigation.”
While the initial order by the court was sealed and Twitter was directed not to disclose the existence of the U.S. government’s subpoena application to the Twitter clients involved, that order was subsequently reversed, reportedly after Twitter mounted a legal challenge to the initial order.
On Friday Ms. Jonsdottir said that she had received a message from Twitter which said, “We are writing to inform you that Twitter has received legal process requesting information regarding your Twitter account @birgittaj. The legal process requires Twitter to produce documents related to your account.”
Soon after, Wikileaks said in a statement, “Today, the existence of a secret U.S. government grand jury espionage investigation into WikiLeaks was confirmed for the first time as a subpoena was brought into the public domain.”
The Guardian newspaper reported that the subpoena also targeted an account held by Jacob Applebaum, an American computer programmer “whose computer and phones were examined by U.S. officials in July after he was stopped returning from Holland to the U.S.”
Mr. Assange was quoted as saying, “If the Iranian government was to attempt to coercively obtain this information from journalists and activists of foreign nations, human rights groups around the world would speak out.”
Neither Twitter nor the U.S. government have commented on the subpoena yet, with Twitter only saying only that its policy was “to notify its users, where possible, of government requests for information.”
Labels: cablegate, Twitter, Wikileaks
Saturday, December 18, 2010
India a “true partner” but “not without limits”: Roemer cables
From The Hindu
The United States viewed India as a “true partner” even if the Manmohan Singh government’s “capabilities are not without limits,” according to dispatches sent by the U.S. Ambassador to India, Timothy Roemer, on the eve of a visit to India by Senator John Kerry of Massachusetts in February this year.
In the latest tranche of private U.S. embassy cables published by Wikileaks, the whistleblower website, a briefing to Senator Kerry from the New Delhi U.S. embassy touched upon numerous areas of friction between the U.S. and India, including barriers to trade in agriculture, unresolved implementation measures in the U.S.-India civilian nuclear agreement and India’s strategic insecurities relating to the U.S.’s plans to eventually withdraw troops from Afghanistan.
However the report predominantly reflected the positive pitch of U.S.-India ties in 2010, following the Indian Prime Minister’s visit to Washington in November of the previous year.
In particular the cable dated February 11, 2010 expressed strong optimism on growing trade and economic cooperation as well as burgeoning defence sales. In the cable, Mr. Roemer also underscored the paradigm shift in India’s thinking on climate change negotiations, where, following the 16th Conference of Parties (COP-16) at Copenhagen in 2009, “India is beginning to understand it must address the climate issue not as a poor developing nation but rather as the major economy it has become.”
The cable however expressed concern at some dimensions of India’s internal politics, specifically questions surrounding what it labelled the 2009 “Sharm al Sheikh Joint Statement fiasco,” following which “heavyweights in the Congress, including Finance Minister Mukherjee [might] seize on any missteps to argue against a policy that reaches out to the Pakistanis.”
The New Delhi embassy also urged Senator Kerry to endorse India’s defence purchases from the U.S. during his visit, pressing home the fact that such sales were “growing quickly from roughly one billion USD in 2008, to over two billion so far this year.” Mr. Roemer added that there was good potential for over four billion U.S. dollars in sales in 2011, especially with the recent Indian Ministry of Defence approval to pursue the C-17 aircraft deal.
The most negative comment in the cable pertained to trade in the agriculture sector. In this regard the cable said that the U.S. continued to have concerns, especially after a Senate Finance Committee Report on Indian agricultural trade barriers highlighted the “essentially defensive agricultural trade policy long promoted by the Indian government.”
The U.S. was particularly interested in gaining marketing access for dairy products which were “blocked due to a series of non-scientific GOI rules,” the cable complained.
Labels: cablegate, Wikileaks, WikiLeaks India
Tuesday, December 14, 2010
China blocked U.N. sanctions against terror group at Pakistan's behest
From The Hindu
Until the Mumbai terror attacks of November 2008, China, “at the behest of Pakistan,” blocked the United Nations Security Council from listing Jamaat-ud-Dawa, widely acknowledged as a front for the militant group Lashkar-e-Taiba, under the UNSC Resolution 1267. LeT has been held responsible for the Mumbai attacks.
The United States' frustration with China for impeding sanctions against JuD through the UN Committee on al-Qaeda- and Taliban-associated entities was made evident in a recent cable, classified as “Secret,” from U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton.
The cable also noted that while JuD chief Hafiz Muhammed Saeed served as the head of LeT too, the LeT's operational commander was Zaki ur-Rehman Lakvi, responsible for the group's military operations budget of approximately $5.2 million.
Issued to the U.S. embassies in Islamabad and elsewhere, the cable was dated August 10, 2009 and was published online by WikiLeaks, a whistleblower website, over the weekend.
Part of negotiation
China's actions on the UNSC prior to the Mumbai attacks were outlined as part of a broader process of negotiation in which the U.S. government sought to oppose a request by the JuD for “focal point de-listing,” under which a window of UN Secretariat could be approached by entities listed UNSC Resolution 1730 to petition for de-listing.
Commenting on the background of U.S. efforts to block the de-listing petition filed by lawyers representing JuD, the State Department cable noted that the UNSC Committee had added LeT to its Consolidated List in 2005, citing its affiliation with al-Qaeda.
The cable went on to note that while the addition of JuD and its leader, Muhammad Saeed, “followed closely on the heels of the LeT-perpetrated attacks in Mumbai,” the U.S.' request, preceding the attacks, “were placed on hold by China at the behest of Pakistan.”
The cable further indicated the U.S.' frustration with the pace of Pakistani efforts to curb the activities of JuD in the aftermath of its listing, contrary to numerous official comments in Washington at the time.
“Raise funds freely'
According to the cable, “In spite of Pakistani acquiescence to the listings in December 2008, we continue to see reporting indicating that JuD is still operating in multiple locations in Pakistan, and that the group continues to openly raise funds.”
The State Department added that it was unclear what steps, if any, the government of Pakistan has taken to freeze JuD assets or otherwise implement UN 1267 sanctions, which included an asset freeze, a travel ban, and an arms embargo. Defending its decision to oppose the JuD petition for de-listing, U.S. officials said in the cable that the intelligence community assessed that LeT used the JuD name as an alias and JuD “provides cover and protection for LeT's militant activities in Pakistan.”
Same entity
The cable further noted that LeT and JuD shared many senior leaders and both organisations stemmed from the same original entity, Markaz-ud-Dawawal-Irshad, founded around 1986.
Until the Mumbai terror attacks of November 2008, China, “at the behest of Pakistan,” blocked the United Nations Security Council from listing Jamaat-ud-Dawa, widely acknowledged as a front for the militant group Lashkar-e-Taiba, under the UNSC Resolution 1267. LeT has been held responsible for the Mumbai attacks.
The United States' frustration with China for impeding sanctions against JuD through the UN Committee on al-Qaeda- and Taliban-associated entities was made evident in a recent cable, classified as “Secret,” from U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton.
The cable also noted that while JuD chief Hafiz Muhammed Saeed served as the head of LeT too, the LeT's operational commander was Zaki ur-Rehman Lakvi, responsible for the group's military operations budget of approximately $5.2 million.
Issued to the U.S. embassies in Islamabad and elsewhere, the cable was dated August 10, 2009 and was published online by WikiLeaks, a whistleblower website, over the weekend.
Part of negotiation
China's actions on the UNSC prior to the Mumbai attacks were outlined as part of a broader process of negotiation in which the U.S. government sought to oppose a request by the JuD for “focal point de-listing,” under which a window of UN Secretariat could be approached by entities listed UNSC Resolution 1730 to petition for de-listing.
Commenting on the background of U.S. efforts to block the de-listing petition filed by lawyers representing JuD, the State Department cable noted that the UNSC Committee had added LeT to its Consolidated List in 2005, citing its affiliation with al-Qaeda.
The cable went on to note that while the addition of JuD and its leader, Muhammad Saeed, “followed closely on the heels of the LeT-perpetrated attacks in Mumbai,” the U.S.' request, preceding the attacks, “were placed on hold by China at the behest of Pakistan.”
The cable further indicated the U.S.' frustration with the pace of Pakistani efforts to curb the activities of JuD in the aftermath of its listing, contrary to numerous official comments in Washington at the time.
“Raise funds freely'
According to the cable, “In spite of Pakistani acquiescence to the listings in December 2008, we continue to see reporting indicating that JuD is still operating in multiple locations in Pakistan, and that the group continues to openly raise funds.”
The State Department added that it was unclear what steps, if any, the government of Pakistan has taken to freeze JuD assets or otherwise implement UN 1267 sanctions, which included an asset freeze, a travel ban, and an arms embargo. Defending its decision to oppose the JuD petition for de-listing, U.S. officials said in the cable that the intelligence community assessed that LeT used the JuD name as an alias and JuD “provides cover and protection for LeT's militant activities in Pakistan.”
Same entity
The cable further noted that LeT and JuD shared many senior leaders and both organisations stemmed from the same original entity, Markaz-ud-Dawawal-Irshad, founded around 1986.
Labels: cablegate, China, terrorism, U.S. secret cables, UN sanctions, Wikileaks
Monday, December 06, 2010
Lashkar militants planned attack on Narendra Modi
From The Hindu
Lashkar-e-Taiba militants were planning “operations... involving a car,” against Gujarat Chief Minister Narendra Modi, according to a recent secret diplomatic cable of the United States State Department released by WikiLeaks, a whistleblower website.
The cable, created on June 19 2009, was sent from the office of Secretary of State Hillary Clinton to “Security Officer, Collective Priority,” and the U.S. embassies in Tripoli, Casablanca and Johannesburg. Some of the information in the cable had been redacted by WikiLeaks, yet it bore Ms. Clinton’s name at the end and was categorised as “Secret,” “No Foreign,” and it was “derived from multiple sources.”
Under the category of “key concerns,” the notes on LeT member Shafiq Khan, and alternatively a person identified only as “Hussein,” said that they continued operational planning on three tasks in early June of 2009.
These plans were associated with a “possible operation against Gujarat Chief Minister Narendar Modi, the establishment of a training camp, and unspecified work involving a car.”
The cable added that Hussein would coordinate his activities with an India-based colleague identified as Sameer.
Providing some geographic information for the operations, the cable further said that the Pakistan-based Shafiq Khafa had been seeking out information on possible training sites for the operations in the Indian states of Tamil Nadu, Karnataka, and Kerala. It added that Khafa had an associate identified as “S.J.” with whom he was making these preparations in mid-June.
Quoting a “credible tearline,” or segment of an intelligence source, the cable went on to note that Khafa’s network was “striving to stand up two teams in southern India that rely on the support of LeT members based in India, Sri Lanka, Pakistan, and Nepal.”
However it cautioned that although specific details of planned LeT attacks remained unknown, intelligence obtained in late May of that year indicated that “Khafa’s cells were engaged in surveillance activities of potential targets, likely in southern India.”
Reports in May further suggested a Sri Lanka link, explaining that the establishment of a facilitation team in that country might then lead to Kerala or Tamil Nadu being used as a base of operations.
“The estimated time of completion for setting up the facilitation route and camps to be two to three months,” the cable said.
Labels: cablegate, Gujarat Chief Minister, LeT, Narendra Modi, terrorism, U.S. secret cables, Wikileaks
We will not give Taliban share of power, Holbrooke assured Rao
From The Hindu
The reintegration of Taliban fighters into any formal governing structure in Afghanistan “is not a political negotiation designed to give Taliban elements a share of power,” Richard Holbrooke, United States Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, assured Foreign Secretary Nirupama Rao.
At a meeting on January 18, 2010, revealed in a private State Department cable published by the WikiLeaks whistleblower website, Ms. Rao was said to have raised “grave concerns about Taliban reintegration plans currently under discussion.”
She and other Indian colleagues had at the time argued that no amount of monetary incentives would induce the Taliban to alter its core beliefs of intolerance and militancy, and expressed scepticism that the British plan for Afghanistan would work unless Pakistan changed its policy on supporting the Quetta Shura and other Taliban elements.
However, Mr. Holbrooke reassured Ms. Rao that the U.S. would not be a party to any such arrangement given, first, the Taliban's links to the Al-Qaeda and, secondly, the social programmes of the Taliban, which were “unpalatable.”
He sought to persuade Ms. Rao that India's concerns on any changes to United Nations Security Council Resolution 1267 were unwarranted, in particular concerns that the policy on terrorism sanctions might be altered with respect to Taliban and Lashkar-e-Taiba leaders such as Mullah Omar, Gulubuddin Hekmatyar, and Hafiz Saeed.
As per the cable, Ms. Rao also brought escalating violence in Kashmir into the conversation, and expressed concern that there had been a “sharp increase in unseasonal Pakistan-inspired violence and preparation for violence.”
Touching on the issues of cross-border shelling along the Line of Control and in Punjab, increased infiltration, and the transfer of terrorist hardware, Ms. Rao said to Mr. Holbrooke: “They are clearly trying to stir the pot in Kashmir.”
When she then informed him that India had not turned its back to Pakistan but needed to see some Pakistani progress on terrorism before it could reengage in discussions, Mr. Holbrooke said he understood “clearly where the U.S. strategic interests lie,” and shared details with Ms. Rao on the evolving political landscape in Pakistan “with a weakening President Zardari and the fluid dynamic between the various centres of power, including COAS Kayani, Prime Minister Gilani, PML-N chief Nawaz Sharif, and Chief Justice Choudhary.”
Labels: cablegate, India-U.S. ties, U.S. Embassy cables, Wikileaks, WikiLeaks Afghanistan, WikiLeaks India
Diplomats withheld criticism of Indian intelligence failures
From The Hindu
In the aftermath of the Mumbai terror attacks of November 2008, European and other diplomatic missions in New Delhi deliberately chose to offer India a sympathetic message “rather than pound on the government for its massive intelligence failure,” according to a cable of the United States State Department released recently by the WikiLeaks.
In the cable, which was dated December 2, 2008 and written by the U.S. embassy in New Delhi to Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, U.S. officials reported that the Australian, British, Canadian, and New Zealand High Commissions had conveyed their intent to adopt this “controlled approach” in their reactions to the attacks.
However, they were equally clear that any offers of assistance ought to be made with care, so as to avoid being interpreted by India as politically motivated or attempts to monitor its actions, and there was a need to take extra care not to get “sucked into the blame game Pakistan and India are currently playing.”
Regarding the investigations into the attacks, the U.S. embassy termed a “Million Dollar Question” the issue whether the ISI was behind 26/11.
On this, the British High Commission officials said that while there were clear links between the perpetrators and the militant group Lashkar-e-Taiba, and also links between the LeT and the ISI, there was “no clear evidence yet to suggest that the ISI directed or facilitated the attacks.”
A contact within the British High Commission in New Delhi also informed the American diplomats that India's move to place high-profile criminal figures, such as Dawood Ibrahim and Jaish-e-Mohammed chief Maulana Azhar, on the Most-Wanted List submitted to Islamabad “took away from the focus on LeT members implicated in the Mumbai attacks.”
In the same cable, the U.S. officials also recorded that a Pakistani diplomat in New Delhi informed them that President Asif Ali Zardari of Pakistan had to “backpedal on [his] initial offer, made before the Mumbai attacks, to send [the] ISI Chief to India,” after misrepresentations of the move in the Indian press fuelled the “deterioration in the Indo-Pak relationship.”
In the aftermath of the Mumbai terror attacks of November 2008, European and other diplomatic missions in New Delhi deliberately chose to offer India a sympathetic message “rather than pound on the government for its massive intelligence failure,” according to a cable of the United States State Department released recently by the WikiLeaks.
In the cable, which was dated December 2, 2008 and written by the U.S. embassy in New Delhi to Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, U.S. officials reported that the Australian, British, Canadian, and New Zealand High Commissions had conveyed their intent to adopt this “controlled approach” in their reactions to the attacks.
However, they were equally clear that any offers of assistance ought to be made with care, so as to avoid being interpreted by India as politically motivated or attempts to monitor its actions, and there was a need to take extra care not to get “sucked into the blame game Pakistan and India are currently playing.”
Regarding the investigations into the attacks, the U.S. embassy termed a “Million Dollar Question” the issue whether the ISI was behind 26/11.
On this, the British High Commission officials said that while there were clear links between the perpetrators and the militant group Lashkar-e-Taiba, and also links between the LeT and the ISI, there was “no clear evidence yet to suggest that the ISI directed or facilitated the attacks.”
A contact within the British High Commission in New Delhi also informed the American diplomats that India's move to place high-profile criminal figures, such as Dawood Ibrahim and Jaish-e-Mohammed chief Maulana Azhar, on the Most-Wanted List submitted to Islamabad “took away from the focus on LeT members implicated in the Mumbai attacks.”
In the same cable, the U.S. officials also recorded that a Pakistani diplomat in New Delhi informed them that President Asif Ali Zardari of Pakistan had to “backpedal on [his] initial offer, made before the Mumbai attacks, to send [the] ISI Chief to India,” after misrepresentations of the move in the Indian press fuelled the “deterioration in the Indo-Pak relationship.”
Labels: cablegate, mumbai terror, U.S. Embassy cables, Wikileaks
Thursday, December 02, 2010
Cables reveal U.S., Pakistan wrangling
From The Hindu
A series of private diplomatic cables of the United States' State Department, released this week by WikiLeaks, a whistleblower website, has cast light upon the complex relationship between the U.S. and Pakistan.
They detail Pakistani efforts to block the U.S. from monitoring the use of civilian aid; a civilian leadership in Pakistan noticeably lacking in power relative to the military yet pleading for U.S. military assets such as drones; and fears that U.S. diplomats had for the safety of their personnel based in Pakistan.
Three diplomatic cables in particular, sent from the U.S. embassy in Islamabad to Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, highlighted the tug-of-war among senior U.S. officials such as former Pakistan Ambassadors Anne Patterson and Ryan Crocker and the former National Security Advisor, James Jones, on the one hand and Pakistani Chief of Army Staff General Ashfaq Kayani, Inter-Services Intelligence Chief Ahmad Pasha and President Asif Zardari, on the other.
One cable, dated October 7, 2009, accounts Ms. Patterson submitting to a two-hour meeting with General Kayani and Mr. Pasha wherein they repeatedly complained about “conditions” attached to the Kerry-Lugar civilian financing bill. Mr. Kayani was noted to have said “there were elements in the bill that would set back the bilateral relationship, and critical provisions were almost entirely directed against the Army”.
In this meeting, the Pakistani officials remonstrated with Ms. Patterson about everything, from insecurities on whether the Pressler sanctions would be invoked to suspend the Kerry-Lugar aid, to the American assessment of civilian control over military promotions and the chain of command. The latter issue, in particular, “rankled COAS Kayani (and) DGISI Pasha said Kayani was receiving criticism on the bill from the Corps Commanders”, according to the cable.
All the U.S. Ambassador could do was emphasise the bill's long-term commitment to Pakistan — $7.5 billion over five years — and make three further points: that the provisions of the bill could be waived; that the bill only required certifications and “assessments;” and that the bill did not apply to the large amounts in the Pakistan Counter-insurgency Fund or Coalition Support Fund.
In another cable, Mr. Jones was recorded as hearing numerous pleas from Mr. Zardari for even more U.S. support in Pakistan's fight against extremist groups on its soil and also hints that the U.S. should convey to Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh the difficulties that Mr. Zardari faced domestically.
The cable, dated June 30 2009, described Mr. Zardari making repeated pleas for drones to be “put in Pakistan's hands” so that Pakistan would own the issue and drone attacks (including collateral damage) would not provoke anti-americanism. “Zardari said the technology behind them was not cutting-edge and said he has raised the issue with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,” the cable said. India has expressed concern in the past that Pakistani access to “killer” Predator drones could inflame tensions on the border.
In the same discussion with Mr. Jones, Mr. Zardari's comments indicated a sense of relative weakness experienced by his civilian government. Mr. Zardari not only emphasised that “goodwill from America was central to his and Pakistan's future” but when told by Mr. Jones that it was vital for Pakistan to ensure that another Mumbai-style attack did not occur, he said that Prime Minister Singh was unaware of what it took to change the mindset of Pakistan's “establishment”, given Pakistan's “short history of fragile democratic regimes toppled by the military”.
In a third cable classified by Mr. Crocker on March 7 2006, U.S. officials recommended to the State Department that the imposition of United Nations Security Council sanctions a domestic terrorism finance designation on Jamaat-ud-Dawa, “an alter-ego of current terrorism finance designee Lashkar-e-Taiba,” be delayed by two weeks based solely on “force-protection considerations.”
Specifically the U.S. embassy explained that U.S. military personnel would be flying helicopter sorties in North West Frontier Province and Pakistan-administered Kashmir until the end of March that year and ground staff would be deployed too.
“In order not to increase the risk to our military personnel as they conclude their successful mission to Pakistan, post recommends that no action on the JuD designation be taken until all... operations have concluded and (U.S.)... personnel are in the Islamabad area,” the cable said.
A series of private diplomatic cables of the United States' State Department, released this week by WikiLeaks, a whistleblower website, has cast light upon the complex relationship between the U.S. and Pakistan.
They detail Pakistani efforts to block the U.S. from monitoring the use of civilian aid; a civilian leadership in Pakistan noticeably lacking in power relative to the military yet pleading for U.S. military assets such as drones; and fears that U.S. diplomats had for the safety of their personnel based in Pakistan.
Three diplomatic cables in particular, sent from the U.S. embassy in Islamabad to Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, highlighted the tug-of-war among senior U.S. officials such as former Pakistan Ambassadors Anne Patterson and Ryan Crocker and the former National Security Advisor, James Jones, on the one hand and Pakistani Chief of Army Staff General Ashfaq Kayani, Inter-Services Intelligence Chief Ahmad Pasha and President Asif Zardari, on the other.
One cable, dated October 7, 2009, accounts Ms. Patterson submitting to a two-hour meeting with General Kayani and Mr. Pasha wherein they repeatedly complained about “conditions” attached to the Kerry-Lugar civilian financing bill. Mr. Kayani was noted to have said “there were elements in the bill that would set back the bilateral relationship, and critical provisions were almost entirely directed against the Army”.
In this meeting, the Pakistani officials remonstrated with Ms. Patterson about everything, from insecurities on whether the Pressler sanctions would be invoked to suspend the Kerry-Lugar aid, to the American assessment of civilian control over military promotions and the chain of command. The latter issue, in particular, “rankled COAS Kayani (and) DGISI Pasha said Kayani was receiving criticism on the bill from the Corps Commanders”, according to the cable.
All the U.S. Ambassador could do was emphasise the bill's long-term commitment to Pakistan — $7.5 billion over five years — and make three further points: that the provisions of the bill could be waived; that the bill only required certifications and “assessments;” and that the bill did not apply to the large amounts in the Pakistan Counter-insurgency Fund or Coalition Support Fund.
In another cable, Mr. Jones was recorded as hearing numerous pleas from Mr. Zardari for even more U.S. support in Pakistan's fight against extremist groups on its soil and also hints that the U.S. should convey to Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh the difficulties that Mr. Zardari faced domestically.
The cable, dated June 30 2009, described Mr. Zardari making repeated pleas for drones to be “put in Pakistan's hands” so that Pakistan would own the issue and drone attacks (including collateral damage) would not provoke anti-americanism. “Zardari said the technology behind them was not cutting-edge and said he has raised the issue with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,” the cable said. India has expressed concern in the past that Pakistani access to “killer” Predator drones could inflame tensions on the border.
In the same discussion with Mr. Jones, Mr. Zardari's comments indicated a sense of relative weakness experienced by his civilian government. Mr. Zardari not only emphasised that “goodwill from America was central to his and Pakistan's future” but when told by Mr. Jones that it was vital for Pakistan to ensure that another Mumbai-style attack did not occur, he said that Prime Minister Singh was unaware of what it took to change the mindset of Pakistan's “establishment”, given Pakistan's “short history of fragile democratic regimes toppled by the military”.
In a third cable classified by Mr. Crocker on March 7 2006, U.S. officials recommended to the State Department that the imposition of United Nations Security Council sanctions a domestic terrorism finance designation on Jamaat-ud-Dawa, “an alter-ego of current terrorism finance designee Lashkar-e-Taiba,” be delayed by two weeks based solely on “force-protection considerations.”
Specifically the U.S. embassy explained that U.S. military personnel would be flying helicopter sorties in North West Frontier Province and Pakistan-administered Kashmir until the end of March that year and ground staff would be deployed too.
“In order not to increase the risk to our military personnel as they conclude their successful mission to Pakistan, post recommends that no action on the JuD designation be taken until all... operations have concluded and (U.S.)... personnel are in the Islamabad area,” the cable said.
Labels: cablegate, U.S. Embassy cables, U.S.-Pak relations, Wikileaks
Not expecting anything good from India: Pak Ambassador
From The Hindu
India was responsible for training and funding extremist groups that were waging a war against the state of Pakistan, Umar Khan Alisherzai, Pakistani Ambassador to Saudi Arabia, said during a meeting with his American counterpart least year.
The comments by Mr. Alisherzai were made publicly available by WikiLeaks, the whistleblower website that rocked the United States State Department this week since it began publishing some 250,000 private cables between U.S. diplomats in Washington and across the world.
The cable, dated October 26 2009 and sent from the U.S. embassy in Riyadh to Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and the U.S. embassy in New Delhi, quoted the Pakistani Ambassador as saying that India had also supported the Taliban in Pakistan, “They (India) will never let a chance to harm Pakistan go.”
The U.S. official recording the conversation went on to note that Mr. Alisherzai summed up his feelings about India by saying, “We are not expecting anything good from them.”
The official also stated in the cable that Mr. Alisherzai had offered some valuable insights into the relationship between intelligence and support provided by the local population in the Federally Administered Tribal Area region and the success of Pakistani military operations.
The U.S. official said that while Mr. Alisherzai’s suggestions on FATA and U.S. strategies to counter the growth of extremism in the region were “worth noting,” his insights on “larger regional issues (such as) Iran, India, and Saudi Arabia appear to be much more limited.”
Elaborating further on what the troubled border region of FATA needed to emerge from its current state of instability Mr. Alisherzai said that investment in education and development was the only way to help the tribal areas, and said that years of “bad luck” had redirected development funds from the tribal areas to the urban population centres.
India was responsible for training and funding extremist groups that were waging a war against the state of Pakistan, Umar Khan Alisherzai, Pakistani Ambassador to Saudi Arabia, said during a meeting with his American counterpart least year.
The comments by Mr. Alisherzai were made publicly available by WikiLeaks, the whistleblower website that rocked the United States State Department this week since it began publishing some 250,000 private cables between U.S. diplomats in Washington and across the world.
The cable, dated October 26 2009 and sent from the U.S. embassy in Riyadh to Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and the U.S. embassy in New Delhi, quoted the Pakistani Ambassador as saying that India had also supported the Taliban in Pakistan, “They (India) will never let a chance to harm Pakistan go.”
The U.S. official recording the conversation went on to note that Mr. Alisherzai summed up his feelings about India by saying, “We are not expecting anything good from them.”
The official also stated in the cable that Mr. Alisherzai had offered some valuable insights into the relationship between intelligence and support provided by the local population in the Federally Administered Tribal Area region and the success of Pakistani military operations.
The U.S. official said that while Mr. Alisherzai’s suggestions on FATA and U.S. strategies to counter the growth of extremism in the region were “worth noting,” his insights on “larger regional issues (such as) Iran, India, and Saudi Arabia appear to be much more limited.”
Elaborating further on what the troubled border region of FATA needed to emerge from its current state of instability Mr. Alisherzai said that investment in education and development was the only way to help the tribal areas, and said that years of “bad luck” had redirected development funds from the tribal areas to the urban population centres.
Labels: bilateral ties, cablegate, India-Pak relations, whistleblower, Wikileaks
India was optimistic on Pak investigation of Mumbai attacks
From The Hindu
Scarcely three months after the Mumbai terror attacks, senior Indian officials expressed appreciation for the “remarkable” progress achieved with Pakistan in the context of the ensuing investigation.
The positive assessment of Pakistan’s contribution to the investigation, made by erstwhile Foreign Secretary Shivshankar Menon to the incoming United States Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, Richard Holbrook, was revealed by the WikiLeaks whistleblower website. WikiLeaks began publicly publishing over 250,000 private State Department cables since the weekend.
Meeting with Mr. Holbrooke shortly after he assumed his role in January, Mr. Menon also sought to dispel reports of growing concerns in India that Mr. Holbrooke’s mandate included the Kashmir question. According to the cable Mr. Menon said the Indian government was aware of the “suspicions the media had created”, in this regard and he emphasised that “India has a huge stake” in Mr. Holbrooke’s success and promised to say so publicly.
On Pakistan’s role in investigating the Mumbai attacks, Mr. Menon had said at a media briefing in early January 2009, “Nobody has told us [about persons arrested in the case] officially yet from Pakistan... We have seen a similar thing when [Lashkar-e-Taiba] was declared a terrorist organisation after the attack on the Indian Parliament in December 2001. And within three months, they were back in business... So, frankly, what we have seen so far does not impress us.”
“Positive track”
However, in the meeting with Mr. Holbrooke, described in a U.S. embassy cable addressed to Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and dated February 17, 2009, Mr. Menon described it as being on a “positive track” and said, “We haven’t reached the point of no return yet” for the Pakistani government to positively conclude the investigation.
He did note that Pakistan had further to go to bring the perpetrators of the attack to justice, speculating, for example, that many of the “30 questions” submitted by Pakistan were added post-investigation in response to domestic pressures. He also cautioned Mr. Holbrooke about the possibility that, similar to the Daniel Pearl case, the investigation could “recede when public pressure wanes.”
Using the opportunity to press the U.S. to exercise its influence, “"where it matters most”, Mr. Menon argued that most of the problems in Pakistan could be traced to the capacity and intentions of Pakistan’s military. These ought to be redirected from east to west and the military must also “cut its links to jihadi organisations” that had gone global over the past five years, he said.
Indian role in Afghanistan
In the conversation described by the cable, it was clear that Mr. Menon drew attention to India’s role in Afghanistan, in particular confiding in Mr. Holbrooke that India planned to tell Afghan Lower House Speaker Mohammad Yunis Qanuni, who was then in New Delhi, that wrangling over an exact date for the election should not be allowed “to bring the house down”.
To do so would only be in the Taliban’s interest, Mr. Menon added, and in reply, Mr. Holbrooke urged Mr. Menon to tell Mr. Qanuni to accept the August 20 election date. Mr. Menon also hinted that Iran ought to be included in a Core Group of countries consulting on Afghanistan. He further added that Iran had been “signalling to India” for four months that it was not interested in having China participate in such a group.
During their meeting Mr. Menon also debriefed Mr. Holbrooke on his attempts, during his time as Pakistan High Commissioner, to explain to President Pervez Musharraf exactly what India was doing in Afghanistan; but Pakistani officials, “not just Musharraf — have avoided it in every way,” Mr. Menon said.
Labels: 26/11 attacks, cablegate, mumbai terror, Pakistan Army, Richard Holbrooke, Shiv Shankar Menon, Wikileaks
A breach of law, U.N. tells U.S.
From The Hindu
Senior United Nations officials have warned the United States that its instructions to diplomats to covertly collect biometric data on U.N. officials would be violation of U.N. diplomatic immunity and a breach of international law. According to media quoting unnamed U.N. sources, “a formal complaint could follow if and when more information about Washington's secret operation emerges.”
The blowback from the U.N. followed close on the heels of the WikiLeaks whistleblower website’s exposé of sensitive cables from the State Department and denials by U.S. officials, including the Secretary of State, that the leak would alter the fundamental nature of U.S. diplomatic engagement the world over.
The reaction by U.N. officials was specifically in the context of one cable, dating from July 2009 and issued in the name of the Secretary of State, which sent to U.S. diplomats in the U.N. a “request for continued DOS (Department of State) reporting of biographic information relating to the UN.”
Under what the State Department describes as the National HUMINT (Human Intelligence) Collection Directive, the Secretary’s office sent this cable to a large number of U.S. embassy officials abroad as well, including the New Delhi embassy.
As per the cable the data that U.S. diplomats were required to collect included such categories as names, position titles and other information on business cards; numbers of telephones, cell phones, pagers and faxes; telephone directories and e-mail listings; internet and intranet “handles,” internet e-mail addresses, web site identification-URLs; credit card account numbers; frequent flyer account numbers; and even work schedules.
Barely 48 hours after WikiLeaks began trickling out private communications between top diplomats in Washington and U.S. embassies abroad, senior U.N. officials were quoted by The Guardian as saying that they had been taken by surprise at the “unusual extent and detail of the activity in the documents”.
In particular, they said, they had been surprised by the requests for biometric information on high-ranking U.N. officials and the permanent representatives of the Security Council from China, Russia, France and the U.K. Some officials said on Monday that they had made representations to the U.S. government outlining these concerns.
However at a press briefing the U.S. representative to the U.N., Susan Rice, did not directly answer a question on whether the U.S. was actually asking its diplomats to spy on the U.N. leadership.
She said, “Our diplomats are just that – they are diplomats. That is what they do every day... I could not be more proud of them as they conduct the work of the U.S. government and do the work that diplomats do around the world.” She added that in today’s complex world the work of U.S. diplomats in the U.N. and around the world was “indispensible to our national security”.
However shortly after the cable became public, Farhan Haq, Acting Deputy Spokesman for U.N. Secretary General Ban Ki-moon, reportedly said, “The U.N. charter, the Headquarters Agreement and the 1946 Convention contain provisions relating to the privileges and immunities of the organisation.”
He added that the U.N. relied on adherence by its member-states to such undertakings, drawing attention in particular to a clause in the 1946 Convention, according to which “The property and assets of the United Nations, wherever located and by whomsoever held, shall be immune from search, requisition, confiscation, expropriation and any other form of interference, whether by executive, administrative, judicial, or legislative action.”
Senior United Nations officials have warned the United States that its instructions to diplomats to covertly collect biometric data on U.N. officials would be violation of U.N. diplomatic immunity and a breach of international law. According to media quoting unnamed U.N. sources, “a formal complaint could follow if and when more information about Washington's secret operation emerges.”
The blowback from the U.N. followed close on the heels of the WikiLeaks whistleblower website’s exposé of sensitive cables from the State Department and denials by U.S. officials, including the Secretary of State, that the leak would alter the fundamental nature of U.S. diplomatic engagement the world over.
The reaction by U.N. officials was specifically in the context of one cable, dating from July 2009 and issued in the name of the Secretary of State, which sent to U.S. diplomats in the U.N. a “request for continued DOS (Department of State) reporting of biographic information relating to the UN.”
Under what the State Department describes as the National HUMINT (Human Intelligence) Collection Directive, the Secretary’s office sent this cable to a large number of U.S. embassy officials abroad as well, including the New Delhi embassy.
As per the cable the data that U.S. diplomats were required to collect included such categories as names, position titles and other information on business cards; numbers of telephones, cell phones, pagers and faxes; telephone directories and e-mail listings; internet and intranet “handles,” internet e-mail addresses, web site identification-URLs; credit card account numbers; frequent flyer account numbers; and even work schedules.
Barely 48 hours after WikiLeaks began trickling out private communications between top diplomats in Washington and U.S. embassies abroad, senior U.N. officials were quoted by The Guardian as saying that they had been taken by surprise at the “unusual extent and detail of the activity in the documents”.
In particular, they said, they had been surprised by the requests for biometric information on high-ranking U.N. officials and the permanent representatives of the Security Council from China, Russia, France and the U.K. Some officials said on Monday that they had made representations to the U.S. government outlining these concerns.
However at a press briefing the U.S. representative to the U.N., Susan Rice, did not directly answer a question on whether the U.S. was actually asking its diplomats to spy on the U.N. leadership.
She said, “Our diplomats are just that – they are diplomats. That is what they do every day... I could not be more proud of them as they conduct the work of the U.S. government and do the work that diplomats do around the world.” She added that in today’s complex world the work of U.S. diplomats in the U.N. and around the world was “indispensible to our national security”.
However shortly after the cable became public, Farhan Haq, Acting Deputy Spokesman for U.N. Secretary General Ban Ki-moon, reportedly said, “The U.N. charter, the Headquarters Agreement and the 1946 Convention contain provisions relating to the privileges and immunities of the organisation.”
He added that the U.N. relied on adherence by its member-states to such undertakings, drawing attention in particular to a clause in the 1946 Convention, according to which “The property and assets of the United Nations, wherever located and by whomsoever held, shall be immune from search, requisition, confiscation, expropriation and any other form of interference, whether by executive, administrative, judicial, or legislative action.”
WikiLeaks: U.S. views India as "self-appointed frontrunner" in race for permanent UNSC seat
From The Hindu
Amidst the massive debris of confidential, secret and unclassified information contained within United States diplomatic cables across the world and exposed by WikiLeaks, notable comments on India have begun to emerge, including the U.S. viewing India as a “self-appointed frontrunner” in the race for a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council.
The whistleblower website headed by Australian Julian Assange had, by Monday evening, put out over 240 out of a quarter of a million communications between State Department officials in Washington and in numerous U.S. diplomatic outposts.
In addition to the reported comment on India’s bid for the UNSC seat, the dispatches published thus far also described a conversation between Abu Dhabi’s Crown Prince Mohammed bin Zayed, and visiting National Defence University President Lieutenant General Michael Dunn.
In the discussion, classified as secret by United Arab Emirates Ambassador Michele Sison, the Crown Prince, dubbed “MbZ,” was described as hinting about Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf’s interest in the UAE obtaining Predator drones from the U.S..
These drones are “hunter-killers,” often armed with Hellfire missiles, as opposed to mere reconnaissance drones, and India has expressed concern in the past that any Pakistani access to such drones could inflame tensions on the border.
According to the cable, during the conversation the Ambassador “asked about MbZ’s visit the week before to Lahore to meet with Pakistani President Musharraf. MbZ chuckled and asked why the U.S. government “always” convinced the Pakistanis to delay news of the capture of senior al-Qaeda operatives such as Abu Faraj al Libbi.”
The cable went on to add that the Crown Prince congratulated Washington for its decision to allow U.S. firms to bid for contracts to provide F-16 combat aircraft and other defence technology to Pakistan, adding that even if “the Indians had and would continue to balk at the decision, the region needed Musharraf to stay strong.”
Further the cable quoted the Crown Prince as saying that the F-16 decision would not tip the military balance between India and Pakistan. “Even if it had, India's strength as a stable democracy would ensure that it would not ever be in as risky a situation as its neighbour,” he said.
The cable then said that “MbZ slapped his knee and said “You will never guess what Musharraf asked me...he asked me whether the UAE had received approval for the Predator!”
At this point the cable cautioned, that the U.S. government’s “inability to meet the UAE’s request for an armed Predator remains a sore point for MbZ, although he has not directly raised the issue with us.”
Labels: cablegate, Hillary Clinton, India's UNSC bid, Julian Assange, WikiLeaks cable view
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