Saturday, January 14, 2012
Manning likely to face court martial
From The Hindu
Snapped on camera after more than a year in military confinement,
he cut a diminutive figure as he was marched to his pre-trial court hearing
between two Army officers. Bradley Manning, the military intelligence analyst
charged with the biggest leak of state secrets in United States history, faces
the prospect a court martial and consequently, a higher likelihood of a lifetime
prison sentence.
At the hearings that were recently completed in Fort Meade,
Maryland, Mr. Manning's attorney David Coombs had argued that there was a lack
of adequate security at the Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility in
Iraq, where Mr. Manning worked. He also centred defence arguments on the Army's
insufficient response to his client's emotional problems.
Defence argument
On the first day of the pre-trial hearing Mr. Coombs challenged
the process itself and asked Investigating Officer Colonel Paul Almanza to
recuse himself on the grounds that the latter was a Department of Justice
prosecutor in the case against WikiLeaks, the online whistleblower that
published a vast trove of U.S. State Department cables.
Mr. Coombs went on to argue that the U.S. Army's charges against
Mr. Manning were excessive and he reportedly made a plea to reduce the charges
from 22 to three.
One of the most serious charges that Mr. Manning is facing is
“aiding the enemy”, which is a capital offence. However, prosecutors and the
investigating officer in the pre-trial hearing have concurred that they will not
seek the death penalty but life imprisonment for Mr. Manning.
Following Col. Alamanza's recommendation that Mr. Manning be sent
to a full court martial, Jeff Patterson of the Bradley Manning Support Network
said he was “disappointed” by the development but was “far from surprised.”
“I sat in that courtroom and watched a Department of Justice
employee pretending to be an impartial judge,” Mr. Patterson was quoted as
saying. He further hinted that the prosecution had been able to present all its
desired witnesses, but had blocked the defence team from calling “all but a few”
witnesses that it had requested.
Labels: Bradley Manning, Iraq war, U.S. Embassy cables, Wikileaks
Monday, December 06, 2010
We will not give Taliban share of power, Holbrooke assured Rao
From The Hindu
The reintegration of Taliban fighters into any formal governing structure in Afghanistan “is not a political negotiation designed to give Taliban elements a share of power,” Richard Holbrooke, United States Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, assured Foreign Secretary Nirupama Rao.
At a meeting on January 18, 2010, revealed in a private State Department cable published by the WikiLeaks whistleblower website, Ms. Rao was said to have raised “grave concerns about Taliban reintegration plans currently under discussion.”
She and other Indian colleagues had at the time argued that no amount of monetary incentives would induce the Taliban to alter its core beliefs of intolerance and militancy, and expressed scepticism that the British plan for Afghanistan would work unless Pakistan changed its policy on supporting the Quetta Shura and other Taliban elements.
However, Mr. Holbrooke reassured Ms. Rao that the U.S. would not be a party to any such arrangement given, first, the Taliban's links to the Al-Qaeda and, secondly, the social programmes of the Taliban, which were “unpalatable.”
He sought to persuade Ms. Rao that India's concerns on any changes to United Nations Security Council Resolution 1267 were unwarranted, in particular concerns that the policy on terrorism sanctions might be altered with respect to Taliban and Lashkar-e-Taiba leaders such as Mullah Omar, Gulubuddin Hekmatyar, and Hafiz Saeed.
As per the cable, Ms. Rao also brought escalating violence in Kashmir into the conversation, and expressed concern that there had been a “sharp increase in unseasonal Pakistan-inspired violence and preparation for violence.”
Touching on the issues of cross-border shelling along the Line of Control and in Punjab, increased infiltration, and the transfer of terrorist hardware, Ms. Rao said to Mr. Holbrooke: “They are clearly trying to stir the pot in Kashmir.”
When she then informed him that India had not turned its back to Pakistan but needed to see some Pakistani progress on terrorism before it could reengage in discussions, Mr. Holbrooke said he understood “clearly where the U.S. strategic interests lie,” and shared details with Ms. Rao on the evolving political landscape in Pakistan “with a weakening President Zardari and the fluid dynamic between the various centres of power, including COAS Kayani, Prime Minister Gilani, PML-N chief Nawaz Sharif, and Chief Justice Choudhary.”
Labels: cablegate, India-U.S. ties, U.S. Embassy cables, Wikileaks, WikiLeaks Afghanistan, WikiLeaks India
Diplomats withheld criticism of Indian intelligence failures
From The Hindu
In the aftermath of the Mumbai terror attacks of November 2008, European and other diplomatic missions in New Delhi deliberately chose to offer India a sympathetic message “rather than pound on the government for its massive intelligence failure,” according to a cable of the United States State Department released recently by the WikiLeaks.
In the cable, which was dated December 2, 2008 and written by the U.S. embassy in New Delhi to Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, U.S. officials reported that the Australian, British, Canadian, and New Zealand High Commissions had conveyed their intent to adopt this “controlled approach” in their reactions to the attacks.
However, they were equally clear that any offers of assistance ought to be made with care, so as to avoid being interpreted by India as politically motivated or attempts to monitor its actions, and there was a need to take extra care not to get “sucked into the blame game Pakistan and India are currently playing.”
Regarding the investigations into the attacks, the U.S. embassy termed a “Million Dollar Question” the issue whether the ISI was behind 26/11.
On this, the British High Commission officials said that while there were clear links between the perpetrators and the militant group Lashkar-e-Taiba, and also links between the LeT and the ISI, there was “no clear evidence yet to suggest that the ISI directed or facilitated the attacks.”
A contact within the British High Commission in New Delhi also informed the American diplomats that India's move to place high-profile criminal figures, such as Dawood Ibrahim and Jaish-e-Mohammed chief Maulana Azhar, on the Most-Wanted List submitted to Islamabad “took away from the focus on LeT members implicated in the Mumbai attacks.”
In the same cable, the U.S. officials also recorded that a Pakistani diplomat in New Delhi informed them that President Asif Ali Zardari of Pakistan had to “backpedal on [his] initial offer, made before the Mumbai attacks, to send [the] ISI Chief to India,” after misrepresentations of the move in the Indian press fuelled the “deterioration in the Indo-Pak relationship.”
In the aftermath of the Mumbai terror attacks of November 2008, European and other diplomatic missions in New Delhi deliberately chose to offer India a sympathetic message “rather than pound on the government for its massive intelligence failure,” according to a cable of the United States State Department released recently by the WikiLeaks.
In the cable, which was dated December 2, 2008 and written by the U.S. embassy in New Delhi to Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, U.S. officials reported that the Australian, British, Canadian, and New Zealand High Commissions had conveyed their intent to adopt this “controlled approach” in their reactions to the attacks.
However, they were equally clear that any offers of assistance ought to be made with care, so as to avoid being interpreted by India as politically motivated or attempts to monitor its actions, and there was a need to take extra care not to get “sucked into the blame game Pakistan and India are currently playing.”
Regarding the investigations into the attacks, the U.S. embassy termed a “Million Dollar Question” the issue whether the ISI was behind 26/11.
On this, the British High Commission officials said that while there were clear links between the perpetrators and the militant group Lashkar-e-Taiba, and also links between the LeT and the ISI, there was “no clear evidence yet to suggest that the ISI directed or facilitated the attacks.”
A contact within the British High Commission in New Delhi also informed the American diplomats that India's move to place high-profile criminal figures, such as Dawood Ibrahim and Jaish-e-Mohammed chief Maulana Azhar, on the Most-Wanted List submitted to Islamabad “took away from the focus on LeT members implicated in the Mumbai attacks.”
In the same cable, the U.S. officials also recorded that a Pakistani diplomat in New Delhi informed them that President Asif Ali Zardari of Pakistan had to “backpedal on [his] initial offer, made before the Mumbai attacks, to send [the] ISI Chief to India,” after misrepresentations of the move in the Indian press fuelled the “deterioration in the Indo-Pak relationship.”
Labels: cablegate, mumbai terror, U.S. Embassy cables, Wikileaks
Thursday, December 02, 2010
Cables reveal U.S., Pakistan wrangling
From The Hindu
A series of private diplomatic cables of the United States' State Department, released this week by WikiLeaks, a whistleblower website, has cast light upon the complex relationship between the U.S. and Pakistan.
They detail Pakistani efforts to block the U.S. from monitoring the use of civilian aid; a civilian leadership in Pakistan noticeably lacking in power relative to the military yet pleading for U.S. military assets such as drones; and fears that U.S. diplomats had for the safety of their personnel based in Pakistan.
Three diplomatic cables in particular, sent from the U.S. embassy in Islamabad to Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, highlighted the tug-of-war among senior U.S. officials such as former Pakistan Ambassadors Anne Patterson and Ryan Crocker and the former National Security Advisor, James Jones, on the one hand and Pakistani Chief of Army Staff General Ashfaq Kayani, Inter-Services Intelligence Chief Ahmad Pasha and President Asif Zardari, on the other.
One cable, dated October 7, 2009, accounts Ms. Patterson submitting to a two-hour meeting with General Kayani and Mr. Pasha wherein they repeatedly complained about “conditions” attached to the Kerry-Lugar civilian financing bill. Mr. Kayani was noted to have said “there were elements in the bill that would set back the bilateral relationship, and critical provisions were almost entirely directed against the Army”.
In this meeting, the Pakistani officials remonstrated with Ms. Patterson about everything, from insecurities on whether the Pressler sanctions would be invoked to suspend the Kerry-Lugar aid, to the American assessment of civilian control over military promotions and the chain of command. The latter issue, in particular, “rankled COAS Kayani (and) DGISI Pasha said Kayani was receiving criticism on the bill from the Corps Commanders”, according to the cable.
All the U.S. Ambassador could do was emphasise the bill's long-term commitment to Pakistan — $7.5 billion over five years — and make three further points: that the provisions of the bill could be waived; that the bill only required certifications and “assessments;” and that the bill did not apply to the large amounts in the Pakistan Counter-insurgency Fund or Coalition Support Fund.
In another cable, Mr. Jones was recorded as hearing numerous pleas from Mr. Zardari for even more U.S. support in Pakistan's fight against extremist groups on its soil and also hints that the U.S. should convey to Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh the difficulties that Mr. Zardari faced domestically.
The cable, dated June 30 2009, described Mr. Zardari making repeated pleas for drones to be “put in Pakistan's hands” so that Pakistan would own the issue and drone attacks (including collateral damage) would not provoke anti-americanism. “Zardari said the technology behind them was not cutting-edge and said he has raised the issue with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,” the cable said. India has expressed concern in the past that Pakistani access to “killer” Predator drones could inflame tensions on the border.
In the same discussion with Mr. Jones, Mr. Zardari's comments indicated a sense of relative weakness experienced by his civilian government. Mr. Zardari not only emphasised that “goodwill from America was central to his and Pakistan's future” but when told by Mr. Jones that it was vital for Pakistan to ensure that another Mumbai-style attack did not occur, he said that Prime Minister Singh was unaware of what it took to change the mindset of Pakistan's “establishment”, given Pakistan's “short history of fragile democratic regimes toppled by the military”.
In a third cable classified by Mr. Crocker on March 7 2006, U.S. officials recommended to the State Department that the imposition of United Nations Security Council sanctions a domestic terrorism finance designation on Jamaat-ud-Dawa, “an alter-ego of current terrorism finance designee Lashkar-e-Taiba,” be delayed by two weeks based solely on “force-protection considerations.”
Specifically the U.S. embassy explained that U.S. military personnel would be flying helicopter sorties in North West Frontier Province and Pakistan-administered Kashmir until the end of March that year and ground staff would be deployed too.
“In order not to increase the risk to our military personnel as they conclude their successful mission to Pakistan, post recommends that no action on the JuD designation be taken until all... operations have concluded and (U.S.)... personnel are in the Islamabad area,” the cable said.
A series of private diplomatic cables of the United States' State Department, released this week by WikiLeaks, a whistleblower website, has cast light upon the complex relationship between the U.S. and Pakistan.
They detail Pakistani efforts to block the U.S. from monitoring the use of civilian aid; a civilian leadership in Pakistan noticeably lacking in power relative to the military yet pleading for U.S. military assets such as drones; and fears that U.S. diplomats had for the safety of their personnel based in Pakistan.
Three diplomatic cables in particular, sent from the U.S. embassy in Islamabad to Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, highlighted the tug-of-war among senior U.S. officials such as former Pakistan Ambassadors Anne Patterson and Ryan Crocker and the former National Security Advisor, James Jones, on the one hand and Pakistani Chief of Army Staff General Ashfaq Kayani, Inter-Services Intelligence Chief Ahmad Pasha and President Asif Zardari, on the other.
One cable, dated October 7, 2009, accounts Ms. Patterson submitting to a two-hour meeting with General Kayani and Mr. Pasha wherein they repeatedly complained about “conditions” attached to the Kerry-Lugar civilian financing bill. Mr. Kayani was noted to have said “there were elements in the bill that would set back the bilateral relationship, and critical provisions were almost entirely directed against the Army”.
In this meeting, the Pakistani officials remonstrated with Ms. Patterson about everything, from insecurities on whether the Pressler sanctions would be invoked to suspend the Kerry-Lugar aid, to the American assessment of civilian control over military promotions and the chain of command. The latter issue, in particular, “rankled COAS Kayani (and) DGISI Pasha said Kayani was receiving criticism on the bill from the Corps Commanders”, according to the cable.
All the U.S. Ambassador could do was emphasise the bill's long-term commitment to Pakistan — $7.5 billion over five years — and make three further points: that the provisions of the bill could be waived; that the bill only required certifications and “assessments;” and that the bill did not apply to the large amounts in the Pakistan Counter-insurgency Fund or Coalition Support Fund.
In another cable, Mr. Jones was recorded as hearing numerous pleas from Mr. Zardari for even more U.S. support in Pakistan's fight against extremist groups on its soil and also hints that the U.S. should convey to Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh the difficulties that Mr. Zardari faced domestically.
The cable, dated June 30 2009, described Mr. Zardari making repeated pleas for drones to be “put in Pakistan's hands” so that Pakistan would own the issue and drone attacks (including collateral damage) would not provoke anti-americanism. “Zardari said the technology behind them was not cutting-edge and said he has raised the issue with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,” the cable said. India has expressed concern in the past that Pakistani access to “killer” Predator drones could inflame tensions on the border.
In the same discussion with Mr. Jones, Mr. Zardari's comments indicated a sense of relative weakness experienced by his civilian government. Mr. Zardari not only emphasised that “goodwill from America was central to his and Pakistan's future” but when told by Mr. Jones that it was vital for Pakistan to ensure that another Mumbai-style attack did not occur, he said that Prime Minister Singh was unaware of what it took to change the mindset of Pakistan's “establishment”, given Pakistan's “short history of fragile democratic regimes toppled by the military”.
In a third cable classified by Mr. Crocker on March 7 2006, U.S. officials recommended to the State Department that the imposition of United Nations Security Council sanctions a domestic terrorism finance designation on Jamaat-ud-Dawa, “an alter-ego of current terrorism finance designee Lashkar-e-Taiba,” be delayed by two weeks based solely on “force-protection considerations.”
Specifically the U.S. embassy explained that U.S. military personnel would be flying helicopter sorties in North West Frontier Province and Pakistan-administered Kashmir until the end of March that year and ground staff would be deployed too.
“In order not to increase the risk to our military personnel as they conclude their successful mission to Pakistan, post recommends that no action on the JuD designation be taken until all... operations have concluded and (U.S.)... personnel are in the Islamabad area,” the cable said.
Labels: cablegate, U.S. Embassy cables, U.S.-Pak relations, Wikileaks
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