Saturday, November 05, 2011
For LeT, India remains the “primary target”: U.S.
From The Hindu
A report by the United States Department of Defence submitted to Congress this week suggested that India remained the “primary target” of LeT, the militant group from Pakistan that is held responsible for the 2008 Mumbai attacks.
This assessment, contained in the Report to Congress on U.S.-India Security Cooperation, was accompanied by strong arguments made in favour of deepening India-U.S. cooperation in the defence sector.
Key among these arguments was the suggestion that the U.S. ought to share “top-of-the-line technology” with India, as exemplified by the case of the U.S. Joint Strike Fighter programme. According to the DoD the JSF, also known as the F-35 Lightning II Programme, has advanced airframe, autonomic logistics, avionics, propulsion systems, stealth, and firepower, which will “ensure that the F-35 is the most affordable, lethal, supportable and survivable aircraft ever to be used by so many war-fighters across the globe.”
In this context the DoD report indicated that although the U.S.’ F-16 and F-18 were not down-selected, in the Medium Multi-Role Combat Aircraft (MMRCA) competition in April 2011, “Should India indicate interest in the JSF, the U.S. would be prepared to provide information on the JSF and its requirements... to support India’s future planning.”
In the vital area of counterterrorism cooperation the DoD report noted that LeT’s activities “continue to threaten U.S. interests and South Asian regional stability,” and hence the U.S. would join with key partners such as India, “to expand counterterrorism cooperation... and our current special operations engagements in the region will continue to focus on the mutually beneficial ways in which we can enhance each other’s capabilities.”
In addition to expanding defence trade and armaments cooperation the DoD report argued that there was a continuing case for bolstering military-to-military engagements. In addition to counterterrorism cooperation this imperative would require continued focus on combined exercises, personnel exchanges and training, maritime domain awareness, countering piracy humanitarian assistance, disaster response and relief and naval and coast guard cooperation, the report noted.
Labels: 26/11 attacks, India, Indo-U.S. relations, LeT, mumbai terror, primary target, U.S. Congress, U.S. State Department
Monday, December 06, 2010
Diplomats withheld criticism of Indian intelligence failures
From The Hindu
In the aftermath of the Mumbai terror attacks of November 2008, European and other diplomatic missions in New Delhi deliberately chose to offer India a sympathetic message “rather than pound on the government for its massive intelligence failure,” according to a cable of the United States State Department released recently by the WikiLeaks.
In the cable, which was dated December 2, 2008 and written by the U.S. embassy in New Delhi to Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, U.S. officials reported that the Australian, British, Canadian, and New Zealand High Commissions had conveyed their intent to adopt this “controlled approach” in their reactions to the attacks.
However, they were equally clear that any offers of assistance ought to be made with care, so as to avoid being interpreted by India as politically motivated or attempts to monitor its actions, and there was a need to take extra care not to get “sucked into the blame game Pakistan and India are currently playing.”
Regarding the investigations into the attacks, the U.S. embassy termed a “Million Dollar Question” the issue whether the ISI was behind 26/11.
On this, the British High Commission officials said that while there were clear links between the perpetrators and the militant group Lashkar-e-Taiba, and also links between the LeT and the ISI, there was “no clear evidence yet to suggest that the ISI directed or facilitated the attacks.”
A contact within the British High Commission in New Delhi also informed the American diplomats that India's move to place high-profile criminal figures, such as Dawood Ibrahim and Jaish-e-Mohammed chief Maulana Azhar, on the Most-Wanted List submitted to Islamabad “took away from the focus on LeT members implicated in the Mumbai attacks.”
In the same cable, the U.S. officials also recorded that a Pakistani diplomat in New Delhi informed them that President Asif Ali Zardari of Pakistan had to “backpedal on [his] initial offer, made before the Mumbai attacks, to send [the] ISI Chief to India,” after misrepresentations of the move in the Indian press fuelled the “deterioration in the Indo-Pak relationship.”
In the aftermath of the Mumbai terror attacks of November 2008, European and other diplomatic missions in New Delhi deliberately chose to offer India a sympathetic message “rather than pound on the government for its massive intelligence failure,” according to a cable of the United States State Department released recently by the WikiLeaks.
In the cable, which was dated December 2, 2008 and written by the U.S. embassy in New Delhi to Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, U.S. officials reported that the Australian, British, Canadian, and New Zealand High Commissions had conveyed their intent to adopt this “controlled approach” in their reactions to the attacks.
However, they were equally clear that any offers of assistance ought to be made with care, so as to avoid being interpreted by India as politically motivated or attempts to monitor its actions, and there was a need to take extra care not to get “sucked into the blame game Pakistan and India are currently playing.”
Regarding the investigations into the attacks, the U.S. embassy termed a “Million Dollar Question” the issue whether the ISI was behind 26/11.
On this, the British High Commission officials said that while there were clear links between the perpetrators and the militant group Lashkar-e-Taiba, and also links between the LeT and the ISI, there was “no clear evidence yet to suggest that the ISI directed or facilitated the attacks.”
A contact within the British High Commission in New Delhi also informed the American diplomats that India's move to place high-profile criminal figures, such as Dawood Ibrahim and Jaish-e-Mohammed chief Maulana Azhar, on the Most-Wanted List submitted to Islamabad “took away from the focus on LeT members implicated in the Mumbai attacks.”
In the same cable, the U.S. officials also recorded that a Pakistani diplomat in New Delhi informed them that President Asif Ali Zardari of Pakistan had to “backpedal on [his] initial offer, made before the Mumbai attacks, to send [the] ISI Chief to India,” after misrepresentations of the move in the Indian press fuelled the “deterioration in the Indo-Pak relationship.”
Labels: cablegate, mumbai terror, U.S. Embassy cables, Wikileaks
Thursday, December 02, 2010
India was optimistic on Pak investigation of Mumbai attacks
From The Hindu
Scarcely three months after the Mumbai terror attacks, senior Indian officials expressed appreciation for the “remarkable” progress achieved with Pakistan in the context of the ensuing investigation.
The positive assessment of Pakistan’s contribution to the investigation, made by erstwhile Foreign Secretary Shivshankar Menon to the incoming United States Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, Richard Holbrook, was revealed by the WikiLeaks whistleblower website. WikiLeaks began publicly publishing over 250,000 private State Department cables since the weekend.
Meeting with Mr. Holbrooke shortly after he assumed his role in January, Mr. Menon also sought to dispel reports of growing concerns in India that Mr. Holbrooke’s mandate included the Kashmir question. According to the cable Mr. Menon said the Indian government was aware of the “suspicions the media had created”, in this regard and he emphasised that “India has a huge stake” in Mr. Holbrooke’s success and promised to say so publicly.
On Pakistan’s role in investigating the Mumbai attacks, Mr. Menon had said at a media briefing in early January 2009, “Nobody has told us [about persons arrested in the case] officially yet from Pakistan... We have seen a similar thing when [Lashkar-e-Taiba] was declared a terrorist organisation after the attack on the Indian Parliament in December 2001. And within three months, they were back in business... So, frankly, what we have seen so far does not impress us.”
“Positive track”
However, in the meeting with Mr. Holbrooke, described in a U.S. embassy cable addressed to Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and dated February 17, 2009, Mr. Menon described it as being on a “positive track” and said, “We haven’t reached the point of no return yet” for the Pakistani government to positively conclude the investigation.
He did note that Pakistan had further to go to bring the perpetrators of the attack to justice, speculating, for example, that many of the “30 questions” submitted by Pakistan were added post-investigation in response to domestic pressures. He also cautioned Mr. Holbrooke about the possibility that, similar to the Daniel Pearl case, the investigation could “recede when public pressure wanes.”
Using the opportunity to press the U.S. to exercise its influence, “"where it matters most”, Mr. Menon argued that most of the problems in Pakistan could be traced to the capacity and intentions of Pakistan’s military. These ought to be redirected from east to west and the military must also “cut its links to jihadi organisations” that had gone global over the past five years, he said.
Indian role in Afghanistan
In the conversation described by the cable, it was clear that Mr. Menon drew attention to India’s role in Afghanistan, in particular confiding in Mr. Holbrooke that India planned to tell Afghan Lower House Speaker Mohammad Yunis Qanuni, who was then in New Delhi, that wrangling over an exact date for the election should not be allowed “to bring the house down”.
To do so would only be in the Taliban’s interest, Mr. Menon added, and in reply, Mr. Holbrooke urged Mr. Menon to tell Mr. Qanuni to accept the August 20 election date. Mr. Menon also hinted that Iran ought to be included in a Core Group of countries consulting on Afghanistan. He further added that Iran had been “signalling to India” for four months that it was not interested in having China participate in such a group.
During their meeting Mr. Menon also debriefed Mr. Holbrooke on his attempts, during his time as Pakistan High Commissioner, to explain to President Pervez Musharraf exactly what India was doing in Afghanistan; but Pakistani officials, “not just Musharraf — have avoided it in every way,” Mr. Menon said.
Labels: 26/11 attacks, cablegate, mumbai terror, Pakistan Army, Richard Holbrooke, Shiv Shankar Menon, Wikileaks
Thursday, October 21, 2010
U.S. didn't warn India despite ‘information & concerns'
From The Hindu
The United States had “information and concerns” on the terror-related activities of the 2008 Mumbai attacks mastermind David Coleman Headley, based on communications received from his spouses. However the U.S. did not provide India with full information or a stronger warning due to a lack of “specific information.”
At a press briefing this week, State Department spokesman P.J. Crowley said that regarding the nature of the information provided to U.S. authorities by Headley's wives, “there was concern expressed by both spouses at the same time,” although the information “was not specific.”
He added that had the U.S. possessed specific information on Headley, it would have provided it to the Indian government beforehand. However the information received did not detail a “time or place of the attack.”
In particular, Mr. Crowley acknowledged that the U.S. law enforcement authorities held two meetings with one of Headley's spouses in late 2007 and early 2008, during which she provided information that was followed up on and relayed to the relevant agencies across the U.S. government.
Commenting on the U.S.' slow response to the information, Lisa Curtis, Senior Research Fellow at The Heritage Foundation, a Washington think tank, told The Hindu, “Many officials in the U.S. government responsible for Pakistan policy often failed in the past to understand the close links between Pakistan-based terrorist groups targeting India and those that target the West.”
Ms. Curtis said that rather than viewing the Lashkar-e-Taiba, the terror outfit Headley was said to have been trained with, on par with the Al-Qaeda, U.S. officials tended to see it only through an Indo-Pakistani lens.
“Not specific”
When Mr. Crowley was asked whether the information provided by Headley's spouses did not mention that he was involved with the LeT, implying that this would have provided a clue about whether Indian targets would be involved, Mr. Crowley only repeated, “There was no specific information as to who he was associated with or what they were planning to do.”
Mr. Crowley's comments came even as reports emerged on Monday that in his statements to Indian authorities in June Headley admitted that the Pakistan spy agency, the Inter-Services Intelligence, had been “deeply involved in planning the 2008 terror attacks on Mumbai, going so far as to fund reconnaissance missions to the Indian city.”
The Associated Press quoted a secret U.S. government report on Headley's interrogation as saying, “According to Headley, every big action of the LeT is done in close coordination with the ISI.”
Mr. Crowley said the U.S. had been pressing Pakistan to take more aggressive action inside its borders to deal with a threat that was of concern to the U.S. and the region.
In the context of the U.S.-Pakistan Strategic Dialogue in Washington this week, he added, “Clearly, this is an ongoing threat and more needs to be done. That will be among the issues talked about during this week's Strategic Dialogue.”
However with regard to the U.S.-Pakistan relationship, Ms. Curtis cautioned that legal issues could arise in the event that direct ISI links were made to the Mumbai attacks, which also killed six U.S. citizens.
She said, “From a policy perspective, there could be major blowback on the Obama administration if it is perceived as stifling information related to a terrorist incident in which U.S. citizens were murdered.”
There were also questions being raised whether the U.S. authorities had failed to follow up on terrorism leads associated with Headley “because it could potentially implicate Pakistan's intelligence service, with whom the Central Intelligence Agency is closely working,” Ms. Curtis, formerly with the CIA, said.
The United States had “information and concerns” on the terror-related activities of the 2008 Mumbai attacks mastermind David Coleman Headley, based on communications received from his spouses. However the U.S. did not provide India with full information or a stronger warning due to a lack of “specific information.”
At a press briefing this week, State Department spokesman P.J. Crowley said that regarding the nature of the information provided to U.S. authorities by Headley's wives, “there was concern expressed by both spouses at the same time,” although the information “was not specific.”
He added that had the U.S. possessed specific information on Headley, it would have provided it to the Indian government beforehand. However the information received did not detail a “time or place of the attack.”
In particular, Mr. Crowley acknowledged that the U.S. law enforcement authorities held two meetings with one of Headley's spouses in late 2007 and early 2008, during which she provided information that was followed up on and relayed to the relevant agencies across the U.S. government.
Commenting on the U.S.' slow response to the information, Lisa Curtis, Senior Research Fellow at The Heritage Foundation, a Washington think tank, told The Hindu, “Many officials in the U.S. government responsible for Pakistan policy often failed in the past to understand the close links between Pakistan-based terrorist groups targeting India and those that target the West.”
Ms. Curtis said that rather than viewing the Lashkar-e-Taiba, the terror outfit Headley was said to have been trained with, on par with the Al-Qaeda, U.S. officials tended to see it only through an Indo-Pakistani lens.
“Not specific”
When Mr. Crowley was asked whether the information provided by Headley's spouses did not mention that he was involved with the LeT, implying that this would have provided a clue about whether Indian targets would be involved, Mr. Crowley only repeated, “There was no specific information as to who he was associated with or what they were planning to do.”
Mr. Crowley's comments came even as reports emerged on Monday that in his statements to Indian authorities in June Headley admitted that the Pakistan spy agency, the Inter-Services Intelligence, had been “deeply involved in planning the 2008 terror attacks on Mumbai, going so far as to fund reconnaissance missions to the Indian city.”
The Associated Press quoted a secret U.S. government report on Headley's interrogation as saying, “According to Headley, every big action of the LeT is done in close coordination with the ISI.”
Mr. Crowley said the U.S. had been pressing Pakistan to take more aggressive action inside its borders to deal with a threat that was of concern to the U.S. and the region.
In the context of the U.S.-Pakistan Strategic Dialogue in Washington this week, he added, “Clearly, this is an ongoing threat and more needs to be done. That will be among the issues talked about during this week's Strategic Dialogue.”
However with regard to the U.S.-Pakistan relationship, Ms. Curtis cautioned that legal issues could arise in the event that direct ISI links were made to the Mumbai attacks, which also killed six U.S. citizens.
She said, “From a policy perspective, there could be major blowback on the Obama administration if it is perceived as stifling information related to a terrorist incident in which U.S. citizens were murdered.”
There were also questions being raised whether the U.S. authorities had failed to follow up on terrorism leads associated with Headley “because it could potentially implicate Pakistan's intelligence service, with whom the Central Intelligence Agency is closely working,” Ms. Curtis, formerly with the CIA, said.
Labels: 26/11, David Headley, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Lashkar-e-Taiba, mumbai terror
Monday, April 05, 2010
India access to Headley “down to logistics”
From The Hindu
The question of providing Indian authorities with access to terror suspect David Coleman Headley is now “down to logistics,” a spokesman for the Federal Bureau of Investigation said today.
Speaking to The Hindu, Special Agent Ross Rice of the Chicago FBI said, “As per his plea agreement Mr. Headley has agreed to cooperate with U.S. and other authorities. If he does not do so, it will be a violation of his plea agreement and his case will then go back to the courts for further review.”
Mr. Rice suggested that the plea agreement worked both ways: “The plea agreement requires Mr. Headley to do certain things, including cooperate with the authorities. It also requires U.S. authorities to do certain things.” He implied that Mr. Headley would need to continue sharing information if he wished to see the U.S. government hold up its end of the bargain.
Mr. Rice confirmed that discussions for providing Indian authorities with access to Mr. Headley were underway and U.S. authorities were hopeful that this would happen in due course. He added, “It is simply down to deciding when, and where, who from the Indian side would be present, whether it would be with Mr. Headley’s attorneys present, whether U.S. authorities would be present and so forth.”
When the logistics for any interviews with Mr. Headley were finalised it would not be announced to the public in any case, due to security concerns, Mr. Rice said.
Labels: 26/11 attacks, David Headley, India, mumbai terror, terrorism, U.S.
Wednesday, March 17, 2010
Headley does a u-turn on plea
In this Dec. 9, 2009 file courtroom drawing shows David Coleman Headley, left, pleads not guilty before U.S. District Judge Harry Leinenweber in Chicago to charges that accuse him of conspiring in the deadly 2008 terrorist attacks in the Indian city of Mumbai and of planning to launch an armed assault on a Danish newspaper. (AP Photo/Verna Sadock, File)
From The Hindu
David Coleman Headly, accused of doing the background planning for the Mumbai terror attacks of 2008, will change his plea to guilty on federal charges, a United States district court said.
Mr. Headley originally pleaded not guilty to 12 charges in connection to attacks in India; he is further charged with a plot to attack Jyllands-Posten, a Danish newspaper that published cartoons depicting the Prophet Muhammed — which however did not take place. Mr. Headley was arrested by FBI agents in Chicago in October while trying to board a plane for Philadelphia.
In a one-paragraph filing the court today said that Headley is scheduled for a change-of-plea hearing on Thursday before United States District Judge Harry Leinenweber. However the filing offered no further clarifications with regards to which charges Headley would change his plea for.
Reports quoted John Theis, Headley’s lawyer as saying that he and Headley “have been in discussions with the government” and Thursday’s action would reflect the results.
PTI adds
The son of a Pakistani diplomat and a Philadelphia socialite, Headley had so far pleaded not guilty to the charges and has remained in federal custody at the Metropolitan Correctional Centre here since he was arrested in October 2009.
John Theis, Headley’s lawyer, refused to give any details when asked whether a plea deal has been worked out for Headley, who has been “cooperating in the ongoing investigation“.
If convicted, Headley faces maximum penalty of life imprisonment or death.
Mr. Theis said: "We have had discussions with the government regarding the plea bargain. We are working on it and we expect there will be a plea agreement."
However, Headley’s cooperation in the investigation is seen as a way to escape death penalty.
Spokesman for Chicago U.S. Attorney Patrick J. Fitzgerald, Randall Samborn said Headley would be present in court for the March 18 hearing.
Mr. Samborn too declined to comment on what charges Headley would be pleading guilty to.
In the 12 count indictment, Headley, a 49 year old Chicago resident, faces six counts of conspiracy involving bombing public places in India, murdering and maiming persons in India and Denmark, providing material support to foreign terrorist plots, providing material support to Lashkar and six counts of aiding and abetting the murder of U.S. citizens in India.
The FBI had also charged Headley’s friend from a Pakistani military school, city-businessman Tahawwur Hussain Rana with providing material support to the Mumbai attacks as well as to the terrorist organisation LeT.
Pakistani-Canadian Rana has pleaded not guilty to the charges and said that he was duped by Headley.
Rana has been denied bail by the court and is held at the Correctional centre since his October arrest. A hearing for his case has been set for March 29.
Headley was first arrested in 1998 for conspiring to smuggle heroin into the U.S. from Pakistan. However, after his arrest he cooperated with the investigation, giving information about his involvement in drug trafficking and his Pakistani suppliers.
Due to his cooperation, he was sentenced to less than two years in prison and shortly thereafter went to Pakistan to conduct undercover surveillance operations for the Drug Enforcement Administration.
In 2002 and 2003, Headley allegedly attended terrorism training camps in Pakistan maintained by Lashkar and conspired with its members and others, including co-accused Rana, Ilyas Kashmiri and Abdur Rehman in planning and executing the attacks on India and a Danish newspaper.
He conducted extensive surveillance of targets in Mumbai between September 2006 and July 2008, taking photographs and making videotapes of various potential targets, including those attacked in the November 2008 attacks that killed approximately 164 people and left hundreds more injured.
After every trip to India, Headley allegedly travelled to Pakistan to share videos and photographs of the targets in India with Lashkar members.
David Coleman Headly, accused of doing the background planning for the Mumbai terror attacks of 2008, will change his plea to guilty on federal charges, a United States district court said.
Mr. Headley originally pleaded not guilty to 12 charges in connection to attacks in India; he is further charged with a plot to attack Jyllands-Posten, a Danish newspaper that published cartoons depicting the Prophet Muhammed — which however did not take place. Mr. Headley was arrested by FBI agents in Chicago in October while trying to board a plane for Philadelphia.
In a one-paragraph filing the court today said that Headley is scheduled for a change-of-plea hearing on Thursday before United States District Judge Harry Leinenweber. However the filing offered no further clarifications with regards to which charges Headley would change his plea for.
Reports quoted John Theis, Headley’s lawyer as saying that he and Headley “have been in discussions with the government” and Thursday’s action would reflect the results.
PTI adds
The son of a Pakistani diplomat and a Philadelphia socialite, Headley had so far pleaded not guilty to the charges and has remained in federal custody at the Metropolitan Correctional Centre here since he was arrested in October 2009.
John Theis, Headley’s lawyer, refused to give any details when asked whether a plea deal has been worked out for Headley, who has been “cooperating in the ongoing investigation“.
If convicted, Headley faces maximum penalty of life imprisonment or death.
Mr. Theis said: "We have had discussions with the government regarding the plea bargain. We are working on it and we expect there will be a plea agreement."
However, Headley’s cooperation in the investigation is seen as a way to escape death penalty.
Spokesman for Chicago U.S. Attorney Patrick J. Fitzgerald, Randall Samborn said Headley would be present in court for the March 18 hearing.
Mr. Samborn too declined to comment on what charges Headley would be pleading guilty to.
In the 12 count indictment, Headley, a 49 year old Chicago resident, faces six counts of conspiracy involving bombing public places in India, murdering and maiming persons in India and Denmark, providing material support to foreign terrorist plots, providing material support to Lashkar and six counts of aiding and abetting the murder of U.S. citizens in India.
The FBI had also charged Headley’s friend from a Pakistani military school, city-businessman Tahawwur Hussain Rana with providing material support to the Mumbai attacks as well as to the terrorist organisation LeT.
Pakistani-Canadian Rana has pleaded not guilty to the charges and said that he was duped by Headley.
Rana has been denied bail by the court and is held at the Correctional centre since his October arrest. A hearing for his case has been set for March 29.
Headley was first arrested in 1998 for conspiring to smuggle heroin into the U.S. from Pakistan. However, after his arrest he cooperated with the investigation, giving information about his involvement in drug trafficking and his Pakistani suppliers.
Due to his cooperation, he was sentenced to less than two years in prison and shortly thereafter went to Pakistan to conduct undercover surveillance operations for the Drug Enforcement Administration.
In 2002 and 2003, Headley allegedly attended terrorism training camps in Pakistan maintained by Lashkar and conspired with its members and others, including co-accused Rana, Ilyas Kashmiri and Abdur Rehman in planning and executing the attacks on India and a Danish newspaper.
He conducted extensive surveillance of targets in Mumbai between September 2006 and July 2008, taking photographs and making videotapes of various potential targets, including those attacked in the November 2008 attacks that killed approximately 164 people and left hundreds more injured.
After every trip to India, Headley allegedly travelled to Pakistan to share videos and photographs of the targets in India with Lashkar members.
Labels: 26/11 attacks, Chicago court, David Headley, mumbai terror
Friday, March 12, 2010
U.S. should take LeT threat 'very very seriously': Ackerman
From The Hindu
In an unmistakable sign of rising concern in the United States over the expansive reach of the militant outfit Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), a Congressional hearing on Thursday emphasised the urgent need to “crush” the group.
Gary Ackerman, Chairman of the hearing, “Bad Company: Lashkar e-Taiba and the Growing Ambition of Islamist Militancy in Pakistan”, said that in the aftermath of the Mumbai attacks in 2008, investigation of computer records and email accounts revealed 320 locations worldwide deemed to be possible targets of LeT attacks, of which only 20 targets were located in India.
Highlighting the relationship between the LeT and the Pakistani military, Mr. Ackerman said the LeT was a deadly group of “fanatics” and the U.S. ought to take this threat “very, very seriously.”
Ms. Lisa Curtis, Senior Research Fellow at The Heritage Foundation and expert witness testifying at the hearing, said, “It has been a failure of U.S. policy to not insist Pakistan shut down the LeT long ago. U.S. officials have shied away from pressuring Pakistan on the LeT in the interest of garnering Pakistani cooperation against targets the U.S. believed were more critical to immediate U.S. objectives, i.e., al-Qaeda shortly after 9/11 and the Afghan Taliban more recently.”
However, overlooking the activities of LeT in Pakistan is the equivalent of standing next to a ticking time bomb waiting for it to explode, Ms. Curtis warned. Furthermore, given that the LeT has cooperated with Al-Qaeda and shares a similar anti-west Islamist ideology, Al-Qaeda cannot be dismantled without also shutting down the operations of the LeT, she said.
'Delicate dance with a Frankenstein’s monster'
Mr. Ackerman pointed out that today LeT were well-financed, ambitious, and, most disturbingly, both tolerated by and connected to, the Pakistani military. This is the same Pakistani military to which we are selling advanced arms, Mr. Ackerman added. There was agreement at the Committee that “Pakistan was in a delicate dance with a Frankenstein’s monster of its own making... which was now going global.”
Mr. Ashley Tellis, Senior Associate, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, concurred on LeT’s deep links to the establishment in Pakistan. He said, “LeT… uses Pakistani territory as its main base of operation, and continues to be supported extensively by the Pakistani state, especially the Army and Inter-Services Intelligence. [However] it does not need constant operational support from the ISI for its effectiveness today.”
'Not just India's problem'
The Chairman’s report at the hearing described the LeT’s substantial global network, stating that it stretched from the Philippines to the United Kingdom. His comments further emphasised that the LeT was not just India’s problem and while it was historically been in the Kashmir valley and the Jammu region, it has also undertaken repeated and numerous mass casualty attacks throughout India, directed at the Indian government.
Touching upon LeT’s broader global agenda Mr. Tellis said, “The organisation’s close ties with al-Qaeda in Pakistan and its support for the Afghan Taliban’s military operations pose a direct threat to U.S. citizens, soldiers, and interests.”
The Chairman categorically stated, “The idea that this group can be appeased on the subject of Kashmir is dangerous nonsense.” He further added that the LeT has not been shy about announcing its intention to establish an Islamic state in all of South Asia, and has been attacking U.S. forces in Afghanistan almost from day one.
During his testimony Mr. Tellis called for greater candidness by the U.S., saying it should stop pretending that LeT is an independent actor. “A candid recognition that the organisation receives protection and support from the Pakistani state would go a long way toward solving the problem”, Mr. Tellis said. He further exhorted the U.S. to be prepared to take action if Pakistan did not move decisively against the LeT.
In his final remarks Mr. Ackerman made a strong statement calling for action, saying, “This group of savages needs to be crushed. Not in a month. Not in a year. Not when the situation stabilises in Afghanistan. Not when things are under control in Pakistan. Now.” If the U.S. did not effectively lead a global effort to do so, Mr. Ackerman added, they would regret it bitterly.
Gary Ackerman, Chairman of the hearing, “Bad Company: Lashkar e-Taiba and the Growing Ambition of Islamist Militancy in Pakistan”, said that in the aftermath of the Mumbai attacks in 2008, investigation of computer records and email accounts revealed 320 locations worldwide deemed to be possible targets of LeT attacks, of which only 20 targets were located in India.
Highlighting the relationship between the LeT and the Pakistani military, Mr. Ackerman said the LeT was a deadly group of “fanatics” and the U.S. ought to take this threat “very, very seriously.”
Ms. Lisa Curtis, Senior Research Fellow at The Heritage Foundation and expert witness testifying at the hearing, said, “It has been a failure of U.S. policy to not insist Pakistan shut down the LeT long ago. U.S. officials have shied away from pressuring Pakistan on the LeT in the interest of garnering Pakistani cooperation against targets the U.S. believed were more critical to immediate U.S. objectives, i.e., al-Qaeda shortly after 9/11 and the Afghan Taliban more recently.”
However, overlooking the activities of LeT in Pakistan is the equivalent of standing next to a ticking time bomb waiting for it to explode, Ms. Curtis warned. Furthermore, given that the LeT has cooperated with Al-Qaeda and shares a similar anti-west Islamist ideology, Al-Qaeda cannot be dismantled without also shutting down the operations of the LeT, she said.
'Delicate dance with a Frankenstein’s monster'
Mr. Ackerman pointed out that today LeT were well-financed, ambitious, and, most disturbingly, both tolerated by and connected to, the Pakistani military. This is the same Pakistani military to which we are selling advanced arms, Mr. Ackerman added. There was agreement at the Committee that “Pakistan was in a delicate dance with a Frankenstein’s monster of its own making... which was now going global.”
Mr. Ashley Tellis, Senior Associate, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, concurred on LeT’s deep links to the establishment in Pakistan. He said, “LeT… uses Pakistani territory as its main base of operation, and continues to be supported extensively by the Pakistani state, especially the Army and Inter-Services Intelligence. [However] it does not need constant operational support from the ISI for its effectiveness today.”
'Not just India's problem'
The Chairman’s report at the hearing described the LeT’s substantial global network, stating that it stretched from the Philippines to the United Kingdom. His comments further emphasised that the LeT was not just India’s problem and while it was historically been in the Kashmir valley and the Jammu region, it has also undertaken repeated and numerous mass casualty attacks throughout India, directed at the Indian government.
Touching upon LeT’s broader global agenda Mr. Tellis said, “The organisation’s close ties with al-Qaeda in Pakistan and its support for the Afghan Taliban’s military operations pose a direct threat to U.S. citizens, soldiers, and interests.”
The Chairman categorically stated, “The idea that this group can be appeased on the subject of Kashmir is dangerous nonsense.” He further added that the LeT has not been shy about announcing its intention to establish an Islamic state in all of South Asia, and has been attacking U.S. forces in Afghanistan almost from day one.
During his testimony Mr. Tellis called for greater candidness by the U.S., saying it should stop pretending that LeT is an independent actor. “A candid recognition that the organisation receives protection and support from the Pakistani state would go a long way toward solving the problem”, Mr. Tellis said. He further exhorted the U.S. to be prepared to take action if Pakistan did not move decisively against the LeT.
In his final remarks Mr. Ackerman made a strong statement calling for action, saying, “This group of savages needs to be crushed. Not in a month. Not in a year. Not when the situation stabilises in Afghanistan. Not when things are under control in Pakistan. Now.” If the U.S. did not effectively lead a global effort to do so, Mr. Ackerman added, they would regret it bitterly.
Labels: al Qaeda, HuJI, LeT, mumbai terror, Pakistan, terrorism
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